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 Worker-Managed Firms, Democratic Principles,
 and the Evolution of Financial Relations
 Charles P. Rock
 and
 Mark A. Klinedinst
 This paper tries to unravel a few important connections among
 economic efficiency, worker management of the enterprise,
 democratic governance, and the history of financial relationships
 within firms. We begin with a definition of democratic firms and
 then present one way (our "RICE" nexus) of addressing crucial in-
 ternal economic relations of viable enterprises. The paper briefly
 examines traditional capital-controlled firms and the internal
 changes they have adopted. Next, we turn to worker-managed
 firms in this same framework and discuss why they tend to revert
 to capital-controlled enterprises over time. A review of some
 means of averting this degeneration is presented before conclud-
 ing. The conclusion addresses the broader question of whether
 there is much hope for the spontaneous creation of democratic
 firms in coming years without additional institutional changes in
 the economic environment.
 The authors are Associate Professor of Economics, Rollins College, and Assistant
 Professor of Economics, University of Southern Mississippi, respectively. This article
 was presented at a session entitled Worker Participation in Profits, Ownership and
 Management, sponsored by the Association for Evolutionary Economics, Allied So-
 cial Science Association Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 2-5, 1992.
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 Democratic Firms as Political Institutions
 A minimum definition of a democratic, worker-managed firm
 requires that the workers govern the enterprise as equals, exclud-
 ing no member, and as a sovereign body. This definition implies
 that all permanent workers each have one vote in the governance
 mechanism. The work force should also have the power to decide
 on the fate of the enterprise and should not be subservient to
 another outside decisionmaking authority. This minimum defini-
 tion does not imply that each worker's income is equal, that hierar-
 chy is absent, and that a management group is not delegated
 authority over day-to-day decisions. It simply means that the work
 force holds ultimate authority and is the final arbiter within the
 firm.
 Economic Efflciency
 To survive in a decentralized, competitive market economy with
 many opportunistic individuals, an enterprise needs to be or-
 ganized to respond to both internal and external pressures. Inter-
 nally, the firm needs to address what we choose to call the 'RICE
 nexus" (risk, incentives, control, effort) problem. This complex of
 interrelated issues addresses, we believe, the major economic ques-
 tions to be answered in the internal institutional organization of
 successful firms. Successful firms solve problems by creating inter-
 nal incentives to motivate individuals to produce adequate eco-
 nomic efforts. The "institutionalization of firms" allocates risks and
 control rights, which also affects enterprise viability. When oppor-
 tunism and uncertainty co-exist, there is no a priori first best
 enterprise design solution for resolving these issues.
 There are many other methods for posing the problem of inter-
 nal organization of the firm. These methods focus on issues of
 monitoring, shirking, implicit/efficient contracts, and so on. They
 can all be subsumed within the RICE complex. Some issues, how-
 ever, such as the external boundary of the firm (the focus of the
 transactions cost approach), exogenous technological change, and
 social and legal environments are external to this analytic nexus
 and are addressed only at the paper's end.
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 Evolving Internal Arrangements in Traditional
 Capital-Controlled Firms
 In a monetary economy, providing finance normally gives the
 provider control of an enterprise, at least if the financier carries
 the primary risk in the case of bankruptcy. Some authors insist
 that capital "naturally" assumes the role of government of the
 firm because of this burden of risk [Bonin and Putterman 1987].
 Moreover, some add that capital holders also have a natural in-
 centive to control in such a manner as to promote the best possible
 results for any economic enterprise taken as a whole. A natural
 evolution produces capitalist enterprises.
 In modern capitalism, however-as Berle and Means revealed
 some 60 years ago-capitalist-owners have become separated from
 the direct control of most sizeable enterprises. A hired manage-
 ment has become the dominant force in firm decisions. This kind
 of management may not always act in the owner-capitalists' best
 interests [Klinedinst 1991], and to reduce this problem a variety
 of management compensation programs have been developed to
 create incentives for control of corporations in accord with the
 goals of absentee owners.
 In recent years, the inadequate incentive to good effort
 provided by either hourly wages or even piece-rate wages for the
 employees in enterprises has received attention [Putterman 19841.
 Contracts for a fixed hourly wage make it rational to minimize ef-
 fort (at least within the limits of avoiding risks of job loss). In
 many cases, piece-rate work may create perverse incentives for
 workers that do not coincide with the goal of either management
 or owners. In recent years, we have witnessed a growing concern
 with "alternative compensation systems" for employees [Blinder
 1990].
 Profit-sharing, bonus, and gains-sharing plans have increased
 the theoretical variability of workers' compensation. These plans
 attempt to increase the connection between effort and incentive,
 while stopping short of any significant increase in the control ex-
 ercised by workers.
 In some enterprises, management and labor have focused to
 some extent on the control aspect of the nexus. By involving
 workers in decisions, better effort has been hoped for [Rooney
 1988]. These firms seem more likely to have longer term "implicit"
 (or even explicit) contracts with workers, so that the financial in-
 centives are also greater.
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 Workers'Production Cooperatives in the United States
 In the United States, production workers have only infrequent-
 ly created cooperatives. Sometimes it happened by necessity, when
 strikes or lockouts occurred. Workers set up cooperative produc-
 tion, which also allowed them to allocate risks and incentives
 among themselves to promote successful effort.
 In the nineteenth century, such autonomous worker-controlled
 activity brought on hostility from traditional firms. This situation
 was especially true if the cooperative competed in the same
 markets. Lacking an authoritative history of workers' coopera-
 tives, we only have anecdotal evidence of active subversion. More
 evidence is available about financial deprivation. Finance capital
 seems to have been largely unavailable to workers' production
 cooperatives, and during the last hundred years advocates of
 cooperatives have always included the lack of finance capital as
 one of the difficult obstacles to overcome in creating these firms. In
 any case, almost all the workers' production cooperatives of the
 nineteenth century disappeared quickly.
 Despite these problems, since 1890, a few hundred workers'
 production cooperatives have been created, and a few have re-
 mained in operation for a generation. However, economically suc-
 cessful firms have tended to revert to traditional capitalist
 ownership. Even when the RICE nexus complex of problems had
 apparently been solved, degeneration occurred. This degeneration
 could occur gradually as a greater proportion of the work force was
 hired simply as employees-without membership in the governing
 group. The voting members of the collective-those who had created
 the firm, and were now "first class workers"-shared control and in-
 centives of potential capital gains and could be relied on to make
 efforts coinciding with both individual motives as well as goals of
 the enterprise as a whole. These members carried risk of both job
 loss and capital gain loss if the cooperative failed. The second-class
 workers risked job loss but not finance capital.
 In these and other cases, successful workers' production coop-
 eratives have reverted to capitalist ownership by outright sale of
 the entire enterprise. This situation was one way owner-workers
 could cash in on equity accumulation. In the case of some workers'
 cooperatives (e.g., U.S. plywood firms), individual memberships
 were sold in order to realize the capital gain, but when the ap-
 preciation was large, it became more and more difficult to locate
 individuals who would "buy a job" (a voting membership share) at
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 a high price. Analogous problems of unrealizable equity have
 faced independent producers' (farmers') co-ops and sometimes
 even consumers' cooperatives. In some of these cooperatives, the
 members have voted to resolve the capital gains problem by jet-
 tisoning the democratic principle of one person/one vote or by sell-
 ing the firm as a unit to another owner.
 Financial Relations for Maintaining Democracy
 in Worker-Managed Enterprises
 One solution to this problem has been the creation of equity-
 like instruments with fluctuating returns within the firm that are
 unrelated to the exercise of control rights. The well-known
 Mondragon system of cooperatives has succeeded in part because
 of this creative innovation in financing, which has allowed the
 RICE problem to be solved while maintaining democratic control
 by the work force. In effect, Mondragon worker cooperatives have
 individualized internal equity funds as part of their capital struc-
 ture [Thomas and Logan 1982]. The major economic problem with
 these came in capital intensive firms, where most workers could
 be expected to retire in the same period, which would drain too
 many funds all at once. This dilemma was partially resolved by
 having a varied age structure of the work force. Mondragon has
 another unique feature that may be even more important at least
 for the successful expansion of the number of cooperatives in the
 system as a whole. This resource is the bank (Caja Laboral
 Popular), which provides start-up capital and technical assistance
 to new cooperatives.
 A technical assistance group for democratic firms, the In-
 dustrial Cooperative Association of Boston, adapted the
 Mondragon internal equity approach to cooperative laws of the
 United States. Through the ICA's initiatives, beginning in the
 early 1980s, special workers' production cooperative laws,
 modeled on Mondragon, were passed in several states. These new
 laws avoided the cumbersome procedure of incorporating under
 traditional cooperative laws (oriented to consumers' and farmers'
 cooperatives), which had certain restrictions that could complicate
 the use of the internal capital accounts. Again, during the 1980s,
 the highly decentralized U.S. movement for workers' cooperatives
 created numerous small technical assistance groups [Rock 1988].
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 Nevertheless, the new, specially-designed, American worker
 cooperative laws seem little used. They appear adequate for incor-
 porating small firms democratically, but firms with with any sig-
 nificant number of employees are driven by another legal
 constraint (or "opportunity"). This opportunity is the generous tax
 relief, beginning in 1974, for joint-stock corporations with
 Employee Stock Ownership Plans. To benefit from these tax
 breaks, it is necessary to incorporate legally as a capital-controlled
 firm. Stock ownership has usually precluded a one-worker/one-vote
 system unless the stock is distributed equally among the work
 force. Even when this is the case, as workers leave the firm, they
 may sell their stock to outside investors.
 Again, the ICA and its chief economist, David Ellerman,
 devised a partial solution-the creation of an ESOP-Trust [Eller-
 man 1990]. This device could hold the stock of employees jointly in
 a trust that could vote the entire block of stock at annual meetings
 to elect the governing board of directors. The work force could thus
 have a democratic vote, which would then direct (and by contract,
 bind) the trustees' vote of the holding trust's stock. This procedure
 was cumbersome and indirect. Moreover, ESOP arrangements re-
 quire expensive initial and ongoing legal and accountancy help as
 well as education for employees regarding the control mechanism.
 ESOP plans are regulated by a complex law (ERISA and amend-
 ments) as well as by interpretation by the Department of Labor.
 Under U.S. law, some unresolved issues remain, such as the re-
 quired distribution of stock to departing employees. The ad-
 vantages of ESOP organization include the ability to gain effective
 control of a firm without buying all the stock, which is especially
 important in capital-intensive businesses. It also permits what El-
 lerman calls "gearing up" or the gradual acquisition of a control-
 ling interest in joint-stock corporations. The results have been
 modest. Although there are over 12,000 firms with ESOPs, a mere
 handful qualify as democratic worker-managed firms as defined
 above [Rock 1991].
 'Natural"Economic Evolution and Workplace Democracy
 Political democracy is an unusual phenomenon and has only
 seemed to evolve "naturally" and unguided in smaller social group-
 ings. Despotism, monarchy, oligarchy, and other inegalitarian
 political systems have more frequently been the choice of those
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 with the power and unrestricted "liberty" to decide on how they
 will govern. Democracy has been created among polities more fre-
 quently by requiring certain behaviors, as well as proscribing
 other activities that emanate from egoism and power-seeking.
 Americans pride themselves on being a nation based on laws-in-
 stitutionalized sanctions and rights.
 Creating democratic institutions may be no less difficult-and
 "unnatural"-in the economic sphere [Bowles and Gintis 19861.
 The U.S. tax regime already is a labyrinth of special provisions to
 promote or deter certain actions. Tax privileges for democratic
 enterprises could be added. Government agencies already promote
 a myriad of activities, so why not new (or modified) democratic
 businesses? A small advance in this direction has already oc-
 curred, albeit at a financially modest level, with the recent alloca-
 tion to new state-level rural development centers to help promote
 cooperatives. These and similar urban centers might also help
 fund experimentation and innovation in the design of new ways of
 institutionalizing economically efficient and democratic enter-
 prises. Financial intermediaries might be democratized as well
 [Gunn and Gunn 1991]. Credit unions already exist and have ap-
 proximately $225 billion in assets, and some have reasonably
 democratic practices. They are severely restricted in their lending
 practices by federal regulators, yet there are ways of maintaining
 their security while expanding their business lending [Klinedinst
 and Rock 1991]. Beyond this, a new law to promote democratic in-
 vestment banks hardly seems radical after the astonishing stories
 of banking finance in the 1980s. Pension funds, which are es-
 timated to own 25 percent of all U.S. equity capital, could also be
 directed toward investments in worker-managed firms. Tax bene-
 fits for investors in democratically controlled enterprises could be
 adopted [Mygind 1990]. This situation would require serious
 thought as to how to maintain democracy in firms that accept out-
 side capital [Vanek 1990]. Already there are many theoretical
 proposals regarding how to accomplish this compromise (and even
 experimentation with new debt/equity hybrid instruments in
 Europe) [Groupes de Travail 1991].
 These prescriptions may be subverted by "dollarization" or in-
 ternational currency flows. Nevertheless, such policies may retain
 potential effectiveness in larger market areas such as the United
 States or the European Community. Certain sectors of any
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 economy are likely to remain more domestically based because of
 the immobility of resources, labor, or physical capital.
 Smaller-scale enterprises have received increased attention in
 the last two decades. Smaller, autonomous (although intercon-
 nected) firms are touted as having greater production flexibility.
 Environmentalists argue that having those who control the firm
 situated in the local community tends to make them more ecologi-
 cally responsible. (Clearly, there is some debate about this belief
 since there are economies of scale in information and certain types
 of compliance with regulations.) Other analysts believe that
 democratic firms will tend to be smaller than nondemocratic ones
 for both economic and political (internal governance) motivations.
 In any case, there are good arguments to be made for subsidizing
 more choice for employees regarding the type of firm in which to
 work.
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